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RATE REGULATION-THE RATE BASE-AMORTIZATION.-The subject of regulation of the rates of public utilities, with its many
collateral problems, is perhaps the most important and the most
uncertain of modern judicial questions. While the courts generally accept the "present fair value" rate base, there is manifest
a dissatisfaction with this theory, and a trend of judicial opinion,
if not of actual judicial decisions, toward the "prudent investment" theory.1
In the West Virginia Public Service Commission case just cited,
the present fair value theory is adopted. In the opinion of Stathers, Chairman, the argument is advanced that, to be consistent,
if the present fair value is adopted as the rate base, it must also
be adopted as to amortization. Divine, Commissioner, argues that
only the amount actually invested should be amortized. Two questions at once arise in deciding this point:
1. Is present fair value the proper rate base, and if so,
2. Should amortization of this present fair value be allowed?
Present fair value as a rate base has been severely criticized but
generally adopted. Through a long series of cases this theory has
been developed until it is now the orthodox theory.2 In brief, the
present fair value rate base permits the utility to earn a fair return based on a consideration of "all relevant facts" which go to

make up the present value of the utility as a utility.3 The "rele-

vant facts" include present replacement cost, less depreciation,
original cost, and other items, from which the present fair value
is computed or estimated.
The opponents of the present fair value theory contend that it
is unfair to the public, in that it permits the utility to earn a
return on "unearned increment," the increased value of the plant
not due to any exertion or expenditure by the utility. It is also
contended that it is mathematically impossible to determine the
present fair value of the utility, and that even if it is once determined, it is such a variable and fluctuating thing that the fair
value today will probably not be the fair value tomorrow. As the
solution, the suggestion has frequently been made that a return be
allowed based on the "prudent investment." The argument adI Missouri ex rel S. W. Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Missouri, 262 U. S. 276 (1923), concurring-dissenting opinion of Brandies and
Holmes; Long Branch Commission v. Tintern Manor Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 71
(1905) ; W. Va. Pub. Ser. Com. Case 1516, in re United Fuel Gas Co., Bulletin No.
91. P. S. C., 38, Mar. 24, 1925.
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898) ; Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.
S. 19 (1909) ; City of Charleston v. Public Service Commission, 95 W. Va. 91, 120
S. E. 398 (1923).
3 Georgia Railway
& Power Company v. Railroad Commission, 262 U. S. 625
(1923) ; Natural Gas Co. of W. Va. v. Public Service Commission, 95 W. Va. 557,
121 S. E. 716 (1924).
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vanced in favor of this theory is that it makes possible a rate
based on something that is determinable as a fact, and eliminates
the uncertainties based on mere opinion or estimate, that are considered the great evil of the present fair value theory.
Undoubtedly present value is difficult to determine, but is that
sufficient reason for discarding the theory in favor of the prudent
investment theory, if the former theory is otherwise just and
reasonable? The "prudent investment" which is hailed as the
panacea for rate evils is really, called by another name, practically
the same as the historical cost, or actual investment. The exponents of the prudent-investment theory contend that because it
eliminates the element of unearned increment from the rate base,
it is a more advanced theory than present value. The argument
presupposes the desirability of the conclusion. What is the evil
in allowing a return on unearned increment?
It is the. opinion of the writer that when money is invested in
a public utility it should be subject to the same chance for natural
increase, or decrease, as is money invested in a strictly private
enterprise, and that income, or return, should include a return
on this increase, or should make allowance for the decrease, as it
does in private business. An investment in a public utility should
be neither a sacrifice for the public good nor a guaranteed investment. It is a fact that it is not naturally regarded as such, for
public service companies are like private companies in that both
are organized with hope of profit, with hope of increase in the
value of property, and with hope of a return on such increase.
There is of course a tendency of the various commissions to allow
a return based on present value or actual investment, whichever is
the higher.4 This tendency is not sufficient excuse for discarding
the present value theory. Commfissions should be consistent, and,
if present value is the accepted rate base, should base the return
on that basis in all cases. In that way, and in that way only, can
the present value theory be logically applied.
If consistently applied, it is therefore the opinion of the writer
that the present value theory, because it allows a return on unearned increment, is better than the prudent investment theory.
As to the second question, the amount to be amortized, Chairman
Stathers' opinion in the case cited above, was that, present fair
value being the rate base, it must also be accepted as the base for
amortization purposes. Divine, Commissioner, dissented, on the
ground that the theory of amortization was that the utility should
4 Brandies, In Mo. ex rel S. W. Bell Telephone Co., v. Public Service Commission
of Missouri, supra.
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have returned to it, in addition to a fair return, the amount actually
invested. To adopt the theory of Mr. Divine would be to allow a
return on the rate base, present value, including as it does the
unearned increment as an element, but to refuse to return to the
owners, in allowance for amortization, this unearned increment.
This seems to present an inconsistency. If present value is proper
as a rate base, why is it not proper when amortization is to be
computed? Present value as a rate base is, theoretically and in
effect, actually, money "devoted to the use of the public by the
utility." In a certain sense this is true, although this money was
not all actually invested by the owners of the utility. True, the
owners have returned to them money they never actually expended,
but if amortizatioii of anything is proper, that seems to be the
only logical amount to be allowed. To hold with Mr. Divine would
be to allow a return based on unearned increment, but to refuse
to the owners of the utility the principal of the same unearned
increment.
The instant case, as a problem of rate regulation, presents many
other questions of as great importance as those discussed herein,
but of such magnitude as to negative the possibility of discussing
them in a note of the scope of this. The problem of ascertaining
the present value of gas leaseholds, the question as to the various
elements proper to be considered in determining present values and
a fair return, are elaborately discussed in the opinion of Chairman Stathers. On the whole, the case seems right both in argument and conclusion.
-C. L. W.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1925

3

